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''.Any intelligent woman who reads the marriage contract and then 
goes into it, deserves all the consequences.·~ 
I NTRODUCTION 
Isadora Duncan poked fun at "the" marriage contr act. But the 
terms of marriage today differ considerably from the state-provided 
terms of Duncan's 1922 marriage to a poet eighteen years her junior, 
which in turn differed from Duncan's parents' marriage. Those ever-
changing marital rules belie claims that marriage is an unchanging 
status mandated by God or Nature. To the extent that changes in-
crease freedom to enter and exit a marriage, as well as to tailor the 
financial r ights and dut ies of spouses vis-a-vis one another, they also 
reveal contractual aspects of marriage. If marriage is indeed a con-
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tract-defined in black letter law as a legally binding promise2-
instead of an immutable status controlled by forces divine or biologi-
cal, then most arguments against same-sex marriage bite the dust. 
Long before marriage equality became a front line in the culture 
wars, family scholars recognized the deep vein of contract running 
through family law,3 though disagreement persists on its particulars 
and policy implications. Elizabeth Scott and her husband Robert see 
marriage as a relational contract, "a long-term commitment to pur-
sue shared goals, the fulfillment of which will enhance the joint wel-
fare of the parties."4 Margaret Brinig, in contrast, sees the law of 
commercial contracts as lacking the concepts of ''love, trust, faithful-
ness, and sympathy" which she dubs "essentialO" to family life, so 
she argues for a covenantal model of marriage that accounts for the 
"solemn vows" that shape families.5 My contribution to this legal ac-
ademic literature has been analogizing marriage to both corporations 
and lending relationships.6 My forthcoming book, Love's Promises, 
goes a step beyond law, contending that both contracts and non-
binding agreements that I call "deals" shape all kinds of families.7 
But even the most contractarian commentators agree that marriage 
is not entirely contractual. Instead most scholars see marriage as 
moving along a continuum from status to contract, taking on a differ-
ent mix of status and contract at various t imes and places.8 Different 
proportions serve different social, political, and economic ends. 
Today, the ratio of contract to status in American family law is 
particularly high, between no-fault divorce, the general enforceability 
of cohabitation and marital agreements, the rise of collaborative law-
yering, widespread recognition of reproductive technology agree-
ments, and the increasing enforceability of open adoption agree-
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 1 (1981). 
3. See, e.g .. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractu.al Ordering of Marriage: A New 
Model for State Policy. 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204. 208 (1982). 
4. Efo:abeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage a.s Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1225, 1229 (1998). 
5. See MARGARET F . BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND 
ECONOM ICS OF THE FA.MILY l, 3 (2000). 
6. Martha M. Ertman. Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women :S 
Work Throu.gh Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998); Maxtha M. Ert-
man. Marriage a.s a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction. 36 HAHV. C.R.-C.L. L . 
REV. 79 (2001). 
7. MAR'l'HA M. ERTMAN, LOVE'S PROMISES: How FORMAL ANO INFORMAi, CON'l'RACTS 
SHAP~: ALL KINDS o~· FAMILl~:s (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author). 
8. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud. 100 CALi i>. L. REV. l, 10 (2012). J anet 
Halley, however. contests this view, instead seeing the very contract/status distinction as a 
vehicle for imposing classical legal formalism into family law. J anet Halley, What Is Fami· 
ly Law?: A Genealogy Part 1, 23 YALE J.L. & Hm<IAN. l, 6-7 (2011); Jru1et Halley, What Is 
Fam.ily lAw?: A Gen.ealog:y Part II, 23 YALE.J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 190-93 (2011). 
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men ts. 9 Yet many people-judges and scholars included-persist in 
seeing love and contracts as opposites. 10 This Article seeks to counter 
that misperception by exploring a post-Windsor legal landscape 
through a lens of contracts and deals. 
I explore the question of what marital contracts might look like in 
a post-Windsor world by zooming in on a common exchange in which 
partners swap financial support for care of home, heaxth, and chil-
dxen alongside a promise of sexual relations. I call it the "paix bond 
exchange." Because it plays an important role in marriage and other 
long term r elationships, focusing on it helps answer the question of 
whether gays will change marriage or marriage will change gays (or 
both). In 2015, over a decade after Massachusetts became the first 
state to recognize same-sex marriage and two years into federal 
recognition of marriage equality, the terms of the average pair bond 
exchange in gay couples differ from the terms of most straight cou-
ples' pair bond exchanges. Unless marriage equality makes gay cou-
ples act like straight spouses, that difference could lead same-sex 
couples more frequently to contract around default family law rules 
like sharing retixement savings that accrue during the marriage or 
providing post-divorce income sharing through alimony. 
This Art icle proceeds in four parts, each addressing a different 
aspect of this exchange. Part I begins with an overview of the role of 
exchange in marriage by cataloging four different disciplines' ap-
proach to that exchange (sociobiology, economics, anthropology, and 
sociology). It then examines cases that illustrate family law's treat-
ment of the three elements of that exchange--money, housework, 
and sex. 
Part II discusses quantitative data about pair bond exchanges 
that show the different pair bond exchanges entered by straight and 
gay couples. Part III switches the focus to qualitative data about dif-
ferences between gay and straight pair bond exchanges. Both num-
ber s and stories indicate that generally speaking, gay couples have 
more egalitarian relationships. They share housework more equita-
bly and have more comparable incomes. But that is largely because 
straight couples are more likely to have kids. Researchers who study 
gay and straight couples raising kids find that about a third of 
straight and gay-male couples have one parent at home full-time, just 
a bit more than the one out of four lesbian-mom couples in which one 
person keeps house full-time.U Moreover, while comparative data is 
9. See ERTMAN. supra note 7, at xiii. 
10. See, e.g., HARVILLE HENDRIX, GETIING THE LOVE YOU WANT: A GUIDE FOR 
COUPLES 237-39 (1988); Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 
2413, 24 16-1 8 (1993) (reviewing RICHA.RI) A. P OSNb:R, S~:x ANO REASON (1992)). 
11. Dan A. Black et a l.. The Economics of Lesbian and Cay Families, 21 J . ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 53, 62-63 (2007). 'fhat exchange may be less common among some sub-
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sca1·ce, there is some indication that heterosexual couples have be-
come more equal over the past few decades, with men changing more 
diapers and women earning a greater percentage of the family in-
come, while gay couples are, as one researcher put it, becoming ''het-
erosexualized," exhibiting less equality in housework and wages. 12 
While the third element of pair bond exchanges-sex-matters 
less for family law than it used to, the law largely ignores agree-
ments about sex, from frequency to fidelity. But because the law is 
not everything, it is worth noting the social science research indicates 
that in this respect lesbian and gay-male couples pa1·t ways. While 
only about five percent of straight and lesbian couples explicitly 
agree that sex outside the marriage is okay, half of gay male couples 
make agreements that allow for sex with other people. 13 
Part IV concludes the Article by predicting how marriage equality 
could change heterosexual marriage and/or same-sex coupling. If the 
pair bond exchanges of most couples change, then family law doctrine 
could and should adjust its default rules to reflect couples' new ex-
pectations. A glance at demographics suggests that forecasters of 
family law evolution ought to follow three things: (1) the children of 
same-sex couples, (2) the ethnographers who document how couples 
actually divide financial and housekeeping responsibilities, and 
(3) the heterosexuals. 
Heterosexual practices are likely to be the most accurate predictor 
of changes in marriage and the legal rules governing it. As of 2011, 
around 114,000 same-sex couples were married (and another 108,000 
or so in civil unions or registered domestic partnerships), compared 
to fifty-six million different-sex couples. 14 It is hard to see how such a 
tiny percentage of married couples could change the rules unless 
much more powerful social and economic forces were behind these 
changes. As Stephanie Coontz observes, marriage has been moving in 
the direction of a partnership of equals seeking personal fulfillment 
groups of gay couples. An in-depth study of fifty black lesbian couples fow1d that they high-
ly value economic self-sufficiency and thus are less likely to embrace that stark version of 
the pail· bond exchange. NlIGNON R. MOORE. INvlSIBLE FAl\filIES: GAY IDENTITIES, 
RELAT10NSHIPS, ANO MOTHERHOOD AMONG BLACK WOMEN 153. 157, 160-61 (2011). 
12. Gabrielle Gotta et al., Heterosexual, Lesbian, and Gay Male Relationships: A 
Comparison of Couples in 1975 and 2000, 50 FAM. PROCESS 353. 372 (2011). One scholar 
suggests that the pre- and post-marriage equality comparisons of households provide a 
·'natural experiment" that should inform both policy and future research. Deborah A. 
Wid.iss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721. 722 (2012). 
l 3. See Gotta, supra note 12, aL 368. 
14. Brief of Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae on the Merits in Support of Respondent 
Windsor at 25-26, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (using 
2010 census data to estimate the number of same-sex married couples and registered do· 
mestic partnerships or civil wiions); Jonathru1 Vespa et al., America's Families and Living 
Arrangements: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU at 3 (2013), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2013pubs/p20-570.pdf. 
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for over a century. L5 Though change will likely flow in both directions, 
I suspect that marriage equality is more likely to change pair bond 
exchanges among gay and lesbian couples than the marriages of het-
erosexual spouses. If social, legal, and economic support leads more 
gays to have children, then the caregiving work those children re-
quire is likely to induce those couples who can afford it to have one 
partner focus more on bread-winning while the other tends to the 
health , education, and welfare of everyone in the household. Indeed, 
as Nan Hunter predicts, that pattern could be one factor that pushes 
family law to move away from providing different rules based on sex-
ual orientation to dictating one set of rules for parents and another 
for couples without children. 16 
I. THE LONGSTANDING LINK BETWEEN 
CONTRACT AND MARRIAGE 
This Part explores the tight link between contract and marriage 
by first mapping some ways that contractual thinking has shaped 
marriage historically and then examining a few contemporary legal 
doctrines that continue to presuppose an exchange of financial sup-
port for caregiving in marriage. It begins at a macro level, looking at 
scholarship on intellectual frameworks that shape families and fami-
ly law, and concludes with a more micro-level analysis of how family 
law treats the property-sharing, care-giving, and sexual fidelity ele-
ments of the pair bond exchange. 
A. The Big Picture of Contract in Marriage 
Many scholars have viewed marriage through a contractual lens. 
Most recently, William Eskridge, a long-t ime scholar of same-sex 
marriage, provided a convincing account of changes in marriage rules 
using the tools of contract theory: default rules, immutable rules, and 
the rules designating how to opt out of a default, which he dubs 
"override rules."17 By tracing family law's general move from manda-
tory rules to default rules over the last century, he r eaffirms Henry 
Maine's 1861 dictum that the move in progressive societies is often 
from status to contract. 18 Where Eskridge provides an overview of 
doctrines ranging from who is allowed to marry to grounds for di-
vorce, I focus on one exchange that shapes daily life in many families, 
15. Stephanie Coontz. The Heterosexual Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (July 5. 2005), 
h ttp://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/opinion/05coontz.html. 
16. Nan D. Hunter, Introduction: The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More 
Questions 'l'hanAnswers. 100 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1877-78 (2012). 
l 7. William N. Eskridge. ,Jr., Family l,aw Plurali..~m: The Guided-Choice Regime of 
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Ru.Les, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1889 (2012). 
18. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: I TS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY 
OF SOCIETY ANO T'l'S RE:LA'l'ION TO MorrnRN IDEAS 168· 70 (16th ed. 1897). 
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the pair bond exchange. Analyzing spouses' division of financial and 
homemaking obligations should help lawmakers and law-shapers 
make more informed decisions about the evolution of default rules 
since default rules generally reflect what the people involved would 
have agreed to had they talked about it.19 
No-fault divorce and marital contracting are nodal cases illustrat-
ing the trend toward private ordering. Both make marriage more con-
tractual by treating marriage as a relationship with an existence and 
terms dictated, in good part, by the people involved. Indeed, the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act reflected that move away from status 
and toward contract by re-naming divorce "dissolution," a term bor-
rowed from the winding down of a business.2° Consequently, baseball 
star Barry Bonds could divorce his Swedish-born wife Susann in 2000 
for irreconcilable differences and keep for himself much of the $43 mil-
lion he brought home playing for the San Francisco Giants in addition 
to the homes, cars, and other things purchased with that money.21 
Before courts enforced contracts that limited property-sharing and 
alimony on divorce, marriage was more of a status- permanent once 
entered, with largely unalterable terms. Courts justified the manda-
tory nature of those rules by citing marriage's immense value to fam-
ilies, society, and even civilization itself. As the Supreme Court fa-
mously put it in the 1888 case Maynard v. Hill , 
Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entire-
ly released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. 
The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to 
various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the 
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, 
for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which 
there would be neither civilization nor progress.22 
Though Maynard concerned legislative divorce,23 the long shadow it 
has cast over family law has supported marriage-as-status argu-
ments against a wide range of reforms. Today that means same-sex 
marriage, but back in the 1880s the Court was more likely concerned 
with interracial marriage. 
Just five years before deciding Maynard, the Court opted to up-
hold miscegenation laws, rejecting a contract-based argument that 
19. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Ru,les, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-93 (1989). 
20. U.M.D.A. §§ 301-16 (1974). 
21. J11 re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817. 838 (Cal. 2000); see also Ken Hoover. 
Barry Bonds Win.~ Big in Divorce Court/ He Get:; Both Hou.~es-Pay to Ex-Wife Cut 50%, 
S.F. GATE (Mar. 9. 1996, 4:00 AM), http:l/www.sfgate.com/sports/article/Barry-Bonds-Wins-
Big-in-Divorce-Court-He-gets-2991024. php. 
22. Maynard v. Hill. 125 U.S. 1.90, 211(J888). 
23. See id. at 203. 
2015) MARITAL CONTRACTING 485 
had made some headway in state courts.24 A number of states in the 
former Confederacy had overturned bans on interracial marriage on 
the grounds that marriage was a contract and miscegenation laws 
ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 
1866's provision giving any citizen the same right that a white citizen 
has to make and enforce contracts.25 However, in the 1880s, white 
supremacists sought to reinstate the ban, claiming that it did not vio-
late principles of equal protection since the laws prevented both 
blacks and whites from marrying outside their race. 26 In 1883, the 
U.S. Supreme Court accepted this rationale as grounds for upholding 
the ban on interracial marriage in Pace v. Alabama. 27 
Rules about marriage have immense influence on other aspects of 
social, political, and economic life. According to historian Peggy Pas-
coe, the bans on interracial marriage formed the backbone of the en-
tire system of racial subordination.28 Judicial and cultural resistance 
to interracial marriage was so strong that the Court avoided those cas-
es even after the twentieth century's civil rights movement was well 
underway.29 Not until 1967 would the Supreme Court finally overrule 
Pace in Loving v. Virginia.30 Little did those justices guess that they 
were greasing the cultural and legal tracks for same-sex couples to 
sign on to the state-supplied terms of the marriage contract. 
But marriage is far too old, varied, and complex an institution to 
be pinned down to either contract or status . Sociologist Kimberly 
Richman captured this truth in interviews with same-sex newlyweds 
in California and Massachusetts.31 Kathy, who married her partner 
Andrea in Massachusetts, initially wanted to marry in order to en-
sure access in an emergency, a fear borne of a trip to the emergency 
room early in their relat ionship.32 But, Kathy told Richman, the ex-
perience of going to City Hall to pick up their marriage license ex-
ceeded those practical bounds: 
I felt almost as moved by that than at any part of the ceremony, to 
see this official form that was stamped with our names on it and 
our parents' names on it, our add1·ess and that said it was ''legal." 
24. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584-85 (1883). 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. X:IV; Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (2012). 
26. P EGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: M rSCEGENA'rlON LAW AND THE MAJUNG 
OP RACE IN AiVIERICA 68 (2009). 
27. 106 U.S. at 584-85. 
28. PASCOE, supra note 26, at 201. 
29. Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virgin· 
ia, 1860s-1960s, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 371. 415-16 (1994). 
30. Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. l, 12 (1967). 
31. See K!MSERLY D. RlCHMAN, LJCENSE TO WED: WHAT LE:GAL MARRJAGE MEANS TO 
SA11H:·SE:x COUPLES (2014). 
32. Id. at 146-67. 
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It said we were married as if solemnizing this document. That was 
an incredible thing. a3 
Aleda, a San Francisco woman, newly wed to her partner Anne Marie 
after a decade together, marveled at a "lovely feeling" of legitimacy 
and ''being part of a big picture": "It's like you just dismiss some-
thing ... you may want to be part of it but you know that you can't 
be ... there was just something incredibly legitimate about it that I 
finally got to experience."34 
Aleda summed it up with the phrase "socially recognizable con-
tract," explaining that she used to think of "the whole marriage thing" 
as "really just a legal contract," but now sees its "social implications.''35 
I, too, remember my trip to City Hall with my now-wife to pick up 
our marriage license, back in 2009. The delight that comes with a 
happy marriage, as well as the great good fortune to live in the era 
when the law decided to honor our family, landed that green license, 
framed, on our dining room wall. 
Marriage seems to retain a mix of status and contract through its 
many incarnations. Take fault-based divorce. On first glance, no-fault 
divorce looks like a move from status to contract because it allows 
unhappy spouses to terminate a marriage in much the way that un-
happy business partners can terminate their "us-ness." But fault-
based divorce also contained contractual elements. If a husband 
breached his promise to forsake all others, his wife could cancel the 
marriage contract (divorce) and get damages (more property, alimo-
ny).36 If the wife was the cheater, her husband could get a divorce and 
recover damages by being excused from paying alimony .37 
The complex inte1·play between status and contract in marriage is 
hardly surprising given the many roles that marriage plays in social, 
economic, psychological, and other aspects of peoples' lives. The im-
portance of marriage-and pair bond exchanges within marriages-
has generated an immense literature on marriage. The next Section 
focuses on one aspect of that literature, the way that scholars in four 
disciplines have conceived of the pair bond exchange. Each discipline, 
we will see, has coined a phrase to describe the swap that reflects 
each discipline's particular focus. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 144. 
35. Id. at 145. 
36. No-fault regimes sometimes continue to account l'or fault. Barbara Bennett Wood-
house. Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Faull in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 
2525, 2532-38 (1995). 
37. Id. at 2535-38, 2558. 
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B. One Swap with Many Names 
The pair bond exchange involves one partner doing more to keep 
up the bank balance while the other does more to keep the home 
front functioning, with sex as part of the deal. Its importance to fami-
ly life is shown by the fact that scholars of evolution, economics, an-
thropology, and sociology have all recognized and examined it. While 
scholars in these fields use different terms, I propose the term "pair 
bond exchange" as a cross-over term that captures much of the vari-
ous disciplines' views . 
1. Sociobiology: The Sex Contract 
According to socio-biologists like Helen Fisher and E.0. Wilson, 
our proto-human ancestors entered an exchange that Fisher calls the 
"sex contract."38 Women exchanged sexual exclusivity and foraged 
food for men's bounty from the hunt, a bit of p1·otection, and help 
with the children. 39 The deal served the larger goal, they contend, of 
getting their genes to the next generation.40 As Wilson explains, the 
especially slow, expensive process of raising a human infant to ma-
turity required a lot of help, giving our ancestors who could strike 
deals with one another a leg up in getting their genes to the next 
generation: 
Human beings, as typical large primates, breed slowly. Mothers 
carry fetuses for nine months and afterward are encumbered by in-
fants and small children who require milk at frequent intervals 
through the day. It is to the advantage of each woman of the 
hunter-gatherer band to secure the allegiance of men who will con-
tribute meat and hides while sharing the labor of child-rearing. It 
is to the reciprocal advantage of each man to obtain exclusive sex-
ual rights to women and to monopolize their economic productivi-
ty. If the evidence from hunter-gatherer life has been correctly in-
terpreted, the exchange has resulted in near universality of the 
paii- bond and the prevalence of extended families with men and 
their wives forming the nucleus.4 L 
But even assuming the primacy of natural selection in shaping hu-
man social arrangements, first-generation socio-biologists like Wilson 
failed to notice that genes need a lot more than bare reproduction to 
get to the next generation. 
38. HELENE. FISHER, 'l'HE SEX CONTRACT: THE EVOLUTION OF Hill1AN BEHAVIOR 85-
105 (1982); EDWARD 0 . WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 137-40 (rev. ed. 2004). 
39. FISHER, supra note 38. at 89-91; WILSON. supra note 38. at 139-40. 
40. See RICHARD D AWKJNS, THE SEL~'ISll GENE 117-23 (2d prlg. 1977); see also 
WILSON, supra note 38. at 137-40. 
41. WILSON, supra note 38, at 139 (emphases added). 
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As the saying goes, it takes a village to raise a child . A second 
type of relationship-creating exchange has more recently come to 
light in work by anth ropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy and psychologist 
Shelley Taylor. Both document ancient as well as contemporary ex-
changes a mong women- often mothers- to help raise their children 
and care for other close intimates.42 If these evolutionary scientists 
are correct, both pair-bonding and tending enabled us to evolve into 
a species apart. 
Family law could, and perhaps should, recognize all of the tending 
exchanges that shape family life, but it does not.43 For better or for 
worse, marriage remains the defining feature of "family" for purposes 
of legal doctrine, so this Article focuses on the role of the marital pa ir 
bond exchange. The reciprocal exchange at the heart of the general 
rules of property and income sharing in marriage may well explain 
why legal rules have long described marriage as a civil contract.'14 
2. Economics: Specialization 
Economists have their own language to describe pair bond ex-
changes, though many economists' view of families-and thus family 
law-fits so well with sociobiology that Richard Posner's 1992 book Sex 
and Reason posits what he dubs a ''bioeconomic" theory of sexual con-
duct and regulation.45 Following Gary Becker, scholars of the area of 
42. SARAH BLAf'FER HTWY. MOTHERS AND 0'rHERS: T HE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF 
MUTUAL UNUERSTANOING (2009); SHELV:Y E. TAYLOR. 'l'HE TENDING TNSTJNCT: WOMEN, 
MEN. AND THE BIOLOGY OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS (2002). 
43. For various models of how family law might. recognize relat.ionships beyond mar-
riage. see, for example, MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, 'l'HE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE 
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 'fWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, 
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRL-\GE: VALUING ALL FAMJLIES UNDER THE LAW (Michael 
Bronski ed., 2008); Laura 1'. Kessler. Community Parenting. 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 47 
(2007); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007). 
44. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *433. Family law. of course. has changed 
greatly since Blackstone. 1n the eighteenth century, the common law treated women and 
chilcfren as essentially property of men, subject to the control and discipline of the man of 
theii· household. Over the past 150 years, however, family law rules have changed to treat 
women and childxen as more fully human. for example, by recognizing wives' rights to con· 
tract and own properly, protecting women and children from domestic violence, and also 
treating fathers of non-mari ta l chi ldren as legal faLhers. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Mod-
ernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights lo Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 
Gw. L.J. 2127 (1994); ,Joseph Warren, H/J,shand's Right lo Wife's Services, 38 HARV. L . 
REV. 421 (1925). Accordingly. I make no claim thaL the ancient. provenance of the pair bond 
deals I discuss has produced identical legal rules over time a11d place. Such a claim would 
be paten tly false. 
45. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). The fam ily resemblance may be in 
part because sociobiology and legal economics came of age together, bet.ween Richard Daw-
kins' 1976 The Selfish Gene, Wilson's 1975 Sociobiology. and Gary Becker's 1979 A Treatise 
on the Family. As early as 1976. Becker sketched out the complementarity of the two ap-
proaches. Gary S. Becker. Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobi-
ology, 14 ,J. ECON. L!'rgRA'l'URE 817 (l.976). 
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research known as the new home economics call the pair bond ex-
change "specialization."46 
These home economists presuppose a division of household tasks 
that characterized U.S. households more in the 1950s than today.47 
In this view, a wage earner "specializes" in bringing home the bacon, 
and his homemaking spouse specializes in frying it up in a pan. That 
is efficient, according to these economists, because each person can 
get really good at his or her role, and they do not have to waste time 
deciding who will make dinner every night. 
Contract is central to this view of marriage, though most commen-
tators acknowledge that marriage is a special kind of contract with 
many terms provided by the state instead of the spouses themselves. 
Posner explicitly compares marriage contracts to a business partner-
ship, contending that courts' failure to fully value homemakers' contri-
bution to families "destabilizes marriage, just as business partnerships 
would be destabilized if courts systematically undercompensated one 
of the partners upon the dissolution of the partnership."48 Homemak-
ers, Posner asserts, need the equivalent of contractual protection to 
invest time, financial resources, and effort in the marriage.49 
In this view no-fault divorce coupled with limited alimony rights 
discourages specialization by making marriage more like employ-
ment-at -will than a long-term arrangement in which partners can 
safely invest their time and effort.50 No-fault and lack of alimony, 
according to these home economists, could inefficiently discourage 
specialization. 51 
Some new home economists see biological differences between 
men and women as providing an additional element of efficiency. 
Lloyd Cohen, for example, posits that men and women play gender 
roles in marriage because doing so is economically efficient, and per-
haps biologically determined.52 Thus, he argues, women make mar-
46. GARY S. BECl<ER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 
1991); Robert A. Pollak. Cary Becker's Contribu.tions to Family and Household Economics, 
l REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD lll, 112 (2003) ("[T]he economics of Lhe family is Gary Becker's 
creation."). 
47. JUOrJ'H STACEY, TN 'l'HF. NAME OF THE FAMI LY: RETHI Nl\I NG FA,\<ITLY VALUES I N T HE 
POSTMODERN ACE 90 (1996). 
48. POSNER. supra note 45. aL 248. 
49. Id. 
50. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, "I Cave Him the Best 
Years of My Life," 16 ,J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 29~) (1987); see also R ICHARD A. POSN~:R, 
ECONOM IC ANALYSIS OF LAW 164 (5th ed. 1998). It is impot·tant to note thaL this insighL 
dilfors l'rom saying Lhat one spouse employs t he other, because the central economic prem-
ise is that they employ each other. See id. at 157. 
5l. See, e.g., BECKER, su.pra note 46. aL 39; see also Lloyd R. Cohen. RhetorU;, the Un-
natural Family, and Women~5 Work, 81 VA. L. Rev. 2275, 2284-85 (1995). 
52. See Cohen, supra note 51. at 2285. 
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riage-specific investments early in marriage, such as specializing in 
the domestic rather than market labor (by, for example, taking pri-
mary childcare responsibility) and foregoing the opportunity to marry 
someone else. Men, he argues, have little to invest in the early years 
of marriage and instead invest in their personal human capital.53 As 
the marriage progresses, according to Cohen, the wife's value on the 
remarriage market declines (even more so if she has children), as do 
her options to compete in the wage labor market.54 This pattern, tra-
ditionalist legal economists contend, encourages opportunism by 
the husband by allowing him to benefit from the wife's early-
marriage contributions to his earning potential and then leave. 55 A 
divorce rule imposing exit costs (i.e., alimony, having to prove fault) 
would deter this opportunism.56 While the new home economics may 
seem hopelessly dated, recent data confirm that the longer a couple is 
married the more specialized husbands and wives become in either 
providing or homemaking.57 
Feminists have long criticized economists' valorization of gendered 
specialization of household labor, pointing out that specialization ar-
guments ignore nonmonetary costs, possibilities of non-gendered spe-
cialization, and the law of diminishing r eturns .58 Economist Barbara 
Bergmann dismisses its conclusions as "preposterous," based on an 
approach she deems "fatally simplistic and, where not irrele-
vant ... misleading."59 Legal economist Robert Pollak critiques the 
assumptions on which it rests.60 When it comes to the complementary 
claims of sociobiology, paleontologist Steven Jay Gould derides them 
as simplistic "Just So stories."6 t 
53. See Cohen. supra note 50. at 287. 
54. See id. at 273. 
55. Elisabeth M. Lru1des. Economics of Alimony. 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 40 (1978). 
56. Cohen, su,pra note 50. a t 285. While the bulk of Cohen's ruialysis seems aimed at 
cri tiquing no-faul t divorce. and he initially sees fault as a "powerful" solut ion to the prob-
lems of ma le opportunism in marriage. he stops short of endorsing a return to fault-based 
divorce because of the impossibili ty of a specific performance remedy. Cohen, supra note 
50. at 299-300. 
57. Axielle Kuperberg, Reassessing Differences in Work and Income in Cohabitation 
and Marriage, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 688 (2012). 
58. See, e.g., Margaxet F. Brinig, Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency. 
82 GEO. L.J. 2461. 2469-73 (1994); Alm Laquer Estin. Can Families Be Efficient? A Femi· 
nist Appraisal, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-4 (1996); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Effi-
ciency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Ee.anomic Justification of Alimony, 82 GEO. 
L.J. 2423, 2437-53 (1994). 
59. Barbara R. Bergmann. Becl~r's Theory of the Family: Prepost.erous Conclusions. 
39 CH/\LLENG~: 9, 9 (1996). 
60. Pollak, supra note 46. 
61. Stephen Jay Gould. Sociobiology: 1'he Art of Storytelling, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 16. 
1978, at 530. Numerous law professors, myself included, sharply criticized Posnet's book 
Sex and Reason for its views of women ru1d the role of reproduction in sexuality as well as 
its deployment of economic theory to human sexuality. See Maxtha Ertman. De11:yi11g the 
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But the evidence that most undermines Becker's view of gendered 
specialization is the economy itself. With the demise of manufactur-
ing in the United States and the rise of ser vice and informat ion sec-
tors, women have begun to far e better in many job markets than 
men .62 That pattern has translated to more women suppor ting their 
families and more men doing more of the shopping, cooking, cleaning, 
and homework help that keeps a family happy and healthy. Yet gen-
dered patterns remain. In 1989 sociologist Arlie Hochschild docu-
mented what she called the "Second Shift" of house work that women 
do in addition to wage labor, a pattern that has not changed much , 
according to journalist Brigid Schulte's 2014 book Overwhelmed.63 
Schulte urges women to let go of being the go-to person for tend-
ing, delegating tasks like dinner and diapers to husbands even if that 
means no vegetables and backwards diapers.64 It is a popular mes-
sage these days, also made by Facebook COO and Lean In author 
Sheryl Sandberg.65 J ournalists Paula Szuch man and J enny Ander-
son's 2011 book Spousonomics likewise supports decoupling gender 
from tasks around the house, though they do argue for the efficiency 
of specialization .66 
For the moment , at least, gendered differences persist . Mothers in 
particula r face daunt ing obstacles to fully engaging in wage labor 
between employment discrimination that law pr ofessor Joan Wil-
liams has dubbed "the maternal wall" and social and emotional pulls 
toward the home front.67 While a 2013 Pew study r eported th at forty 
percent of women are the prime breadwinners in their household, 
many of those women are single mothers .68 On an average day in 
Secret of Joy: A Critique of Posner's Theory of Sexuality. 45 STAN. L . REV. 1485 (1993); 
Gillian K. Hadfield. Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics of Sexual 
Man. 106 HARV. L. REV. 479 (1992) (book review). 
62. See LtZA MUNDY, THE RlCHER SEX: How THE NEW MAJORITY OF FEMALE 
BREAJ)WJNNERS IS TRANSFORMING SEX, LOVE, ANO FAMll.Y (2012); HANNA ROSIN, THE ENO 
OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 3-5 (2012). 
63. Ml.IE RUSSEl.l. HOCHSCHtLD & ANNE MACH UNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (1989); BRIGlD 
SCHULTE, OVERWHELMED: WORK, LOVE, AND PLAY WHEN NO ONE HAS'l'HETrME 16(2014). 
64. SCHUl.TE, supra nole 63, ai 283. 
65. See SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 108-
09 (2013). 
66. PAULA SZUCHMAN & JENNY ANDERSON, SPOUSONOMICS: USING ECONOMICS TO 
MASTER LOVE. MARRtAGE. AND D IRTY DISHES 14-19 (2011). 'l'he common tendency to resist 
that kind of mixing of love and economic rhetoric seems to have led the publisher to re-title 
the book in paperback [l's Not You, It's lh.e Dishes: How to Minimize Conflict and Maximize 
Happiness in Your Relationship in 2012. 
67. ,JOAN C. W ILl,IAMS. RESHAPING 'l'HI~ WORK-FAM ILY DE:BA'l'~: : WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER 5 (2010); see al.so MARGARET KLAW. KEEPING 11' C[VIL: T HE CAS~: OF THE PRE-
NUP /\ND THE: P ORSCHE: & 0 'l'HE:H TRUE ACCOUNTS FROM THE FILES OF A FAM l l.Y LAWYEH 
239-42 (2013). 
68. WENDY WANG ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., BREADWINNER MOMS (2013). available at 
http://www.pewsocia ltrends.org/liles/2013/05/Breadwinner_moms_Jina].pdf. 
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2013, only nineteen percent of men did housework like cleaning or 
laundry, compared to forty-nine percent of women.69 Mothers of 
young children spent 1.1 hours bathing or feeding them each day, two 
and a half times more than fathers, who spent just twenty-six 
minutes on these tasks.70 Not surprisingly, men, on average, enjoy 
thirty minutes more leisure time a day than women do.71 
All that data supports two points that relate to marital contract-
ing in a post-Windsor world. First, families need both homemaking 
and financial support to thrive. Second, in most families one spouse 
still does more of one than the other, though the link between gender 
and that labor is not as tight as it once was. 
3. Anthropology: Gift Exchanges 
Anthropologist Marcel Mauss's model addresses the concerns 
some scholars raise about economic views of how families operate by 
acknowledging the role of emotion and culture in the pair bond ex-
change. According to Mauss, a gift usually comes with an obligation to 
reciprocate, transforming the seemingly unilateral gift into a back-
and-forth transaction that creates a social and even spfritual bond.72 A 
slacker husband, in this view, dishonors himself by failing to recipro-
cate all of his wife's "gifts." She would be better off finding someone 
more adept at holding up his end of what Mauss calls "gift exchanges." 
Expectations of reciprocity also hold sway outside the family. Tith-
ing ten percent of your income is part of many religious communities, 
and some people say it helps pave the way to eternal life. Parents 
take turns carpooling to soccer practice. Colleagues swap informat ion 
to get ahead at work. It is hard to imagine any kind of genuine, last-
ing relationship that does not include both giving and getting. People 
do not experience this pattern as a tit-for-tat with precise accounting, 
but instead something m01·e along the lines of a t it -for-two-or-three-
tats, a mix of gift and exchange.73 
4. Sociology: Economic Lives 
To my mind Princeton sociologist Viviana Zelizer 's work on over-
laps between love and exchange provides the best analytic framework 
to explore pair bond exchanges because it incorporates the insights of 
69. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor. American Time Use 
Sm·vey - 2013 (June 18, 2014. lO:OOAM), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
pdf/atus. pelf. 
70. Id. 
7l. See Liana C. Sayer, Gender, Ti.me and Inequality: Trends in Women's and Men's 
Paid Work, Unpaid Work and Free Ti.me, 84 Soc. FORCES 285. 296 (2005). 
72. MARCE:L MAUSS, THE GWl' 13-14 (W.D. Halls trruis .. 1990). 
73. See RICHARD D AWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (3d ed. 2006). 
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economics and anthropology alongside her home discipline, sociology. 
Her major contribution is giving us language to differentiate various 
views of what happens when love and contracts overlap.74 First, she 
dubs the most common view as "Hostile Worlds."75 
Hostile Worlds approaches see sharp, impermeable boundaries 
between money and contested commodities like love, babies, and 
body paxts and claim that any overlap between markets and intimacy 
will contaminate one or both.76 Host ile Worlds analysis treats love 
and contracts as realms so far away from each other that one's cur-
rency has no meaning or value in the other.77 For example, the court 
in the 1988 Baby M suxrogacy case refused to enforce a surrogacy 
contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern, declaring 
that "ft]he1·e are, in a civilized society, some things that money can-
not buy."78 Yet if people could not contract in and out of parenthood 
for a price, sperm banks like the California Cryobank, which buy 
sperm from "donors" and sell it to would-be mothers, could not exist.79 
Those sales are entirely lawful, protected by both state statutes and 
judicial opinions.so 
Courts also have taken a Hostile Worlds approach when examin-
ing pair bond exchanges. Back in 1889, the Iowa Supreme Court 
t reated Nancy Miller's homemaking labor as a puxe gift when it re-
fused to enforce her husband Robert's formal, written promise to pay 
her two hundred dollars a year to "keep her home and family in a 
comfortable and reasonably good condition" in exchange for his 
providing "the necessary expenses of the family."81 The Millers were 
trying to patch things up after Robert ran around with other wom-
en.82 Alongside promises to pay for homemaking, they agreed that 
"past subjects and causes of dispute, disagreement, and complaint" 
would be "absolutely ignored and buried."83 But rather than enforce 
the Millers' caxefully w01·ded reconciliation agreement, the court de-
moted it to a mere deal because, it reasoned, Nancy did only what 
"the law [already] required her to do."84 
74. VLVIANA A. z~:LJZER. THE P URCHASE Of IN't'ClvlACY 22 (2007). 
75. Id. at 20. 
76. Id. at 26-27. 
77. Id. at 22. 
78. Jn re Baby M. 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988). 
79. See D EBORA L. SPAR. THE B ABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 
DRlVE 'rH E COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 39 (2006). 
80. ERTMAN, supra note 7. at 27-66. 
81. Miller v. Miller, 42 N.W. 641, 641(Iowa1889). 
82. The detail about Mr. MiUer's wandering appears in an earl ier opinion in t he same 
case. Miller v. Miller, 35 N.W. 464. 464 (Iowa 1887). 
83. Miller. 42 N.W. at 641. 
84. Id. at 642. 
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Zelizer also coined a term that captures the essence of the main 
alternative to Hostile Worlds views. Seeing Chicago-school la w and 
economics scholars like Becker and Posner as reducing family to 
"nothing but" rational market exchanges, she labels that analytical 
error "Nothing But."85 A Nothing But approach sees the world as 
t ransacting business of all sorts in a single currency, from sex to 
strawberries.86 Through that lens, an interaction is all economic ex-
change or all something else like coercion. 87 
According to Zelizer, both Hostile Worlds and Nothing But views 
distort the reality of family life. Seeing a marriage as Nothing But a 
self-interested maximizat ion of one's wealth or presence in the gene 
pool ignores crucial aspects of social and emotional life, 88 just as a 
Hostile Worlds view of marriage cannot explain why legal rules car e-
fully calibrate spouses' financial rights and duties.89 Nothing But 
views bleach out love and other emotions, while Hostile Worlds ap-
proaches bleach out exchange elements of intimacy. Out of the rubble 
of the now-discredited Hostile Worlds and Nothing But views of fami-
ly exchanges, Zelizer offers her own approach, which maps the way 
that markets both shape and are shaped by social t ies. She calls it 
"Economic Lives."90 
Viewing the details of exchange within families through the lens 
of Economic Lives would allow emotions that make marriage, as the 
newly-wed Aleda put it, "a socially recognized contract"91 and also 
help law do a better job at valuing the tending half of t he pair bond 
exchange. 
C. Family Law Treatment of the Pair Bond Exchange 
Family law has long recognized the pair bond exchange, though its 
rules have treated t he elements-property-sharing, homemaking, and 
sex- differently over time. Moreover, like the scholarship r eviewed 
above, family law has its own terminology to describe the exchange. 
The traditional "essentials" of marriage are a swap of financial 
support for domestic services, with sexual access and exclusivity in-
cluded.92 Historically, the rules of coverture required a husband to 
85. ZELIZER. supra note 74, at 29. 
86. Id. at 30. 
87. Id. at 30-31. 
88. Id. at 32. 
89. Id. at 27. 
90. VIVIANA A. ZEL!7.ER, ECONOM IC LIVES: How CULTURE S HAPES THE ECONOMY 
(2011). In eai·lier work, she dubbed the interplay between exchruige and int imacy "connect-
ed lives." ld. at 4; ZELIZER, supra note 74, at 32-35. 
91. See supra noLe 35 and accompanying text. 
92. Twila L. Perry, 1'he "Essentials of Marriage': Reconsidering the Duty of Suppo1t 
and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEtvn NISM 1, 8-9 (2003). 
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pay for his wife's "necessaries" and required a wife to care for the 
home and children.93 Until the 1970s, the sexual access element justi-
fied the marital rape exception, relieving a husband of liability for 
taking that which was already his (sexual access to his wife).94 
Though today marital rape is a crime, thanks to the feminist 
movement,95 sex remains an "essential" of marriage in some ways. 
Some states impose lighter penalties for marital rape than rape by a 
stranger.96 Outside the rape context, refusal to engage in sexual rela-
tions can be grounds for divorce in some states, and concealed impo-
tence can be grounds for an annulment. 97 The essentials of marriage, 
sometimes called "the duty of support and services," remain "deeply 
entrenched" in family law doctrines.98 Entrenched as the idea is, the 
seismic changes in marriages over the twentieth and early twenty-
first century make both judges and scholars shy away from the 
phrase "essentials of marriage." 
My term-pair bond exchange-may fare better. New language 
helps us think in new ways, and the phrase "pair bond" evokes the 
emotional closeness that our contemporary ideals of companionate 
marriage strive for. It also remains relatively free from some of the 
gendered constraints of the old view of marital obligations like obedi-
ence of wives to husbands. Finally, the term "exchange" recognizes 
the role of reciprocity in marital relationships, which has both mate-
rial and emotional benefits. 
Exchange, in my mind, is often more important than whether a 
particular exchange is legally binding. Families a1·e shaped by both 
legally binding agreements--contracts99-and agreements that courts 
would not enforce, which I call "deals."LOO Some agreements- like sell-
ing babies or a swap of I'll-cook-if-you-clean-up- are mere deals be-
cause they violate public policy or are too small or informal for courts 
to get involved with. 101 Some deals, like baby-selling, are also crimes. 
But most are entirely lawful. They matter despite the fact that the 
people involved never expect them to get to court. Think of common 
household arrangements like agreeing to keep a kosher kitchen or 
spouses' half-joking pact that "no one gets fat." No one would sue, yet 
these deals structure relationships. Deals can be big things like sex-
93. ld. at 3. 
94. ld. at 30. 
95. Eskridge, supra noLe 17. at 1914-15. 
96. Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper liifer-
ences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1490-91 (2003). 
97. Perry. supra note 92, at 30. 
98. Id. at 7. 
99. Rl':S'l'A'l'F.MENT (SF.CONO) Of CON'l'RACTS § 1 (1981). 
100. See ERTMAN. supra note 7. 
101. RF.S'l'A'l'F.MENT (SF.CONO) OJ> CON'l'RACTS §§ 33, 110, 126-27 (1981). 
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ual fidelity or casual, implicit, daily household exchanges about 
laundry and lawn care. They shape intimate relationships by creat-
ing expectations of reciprocity and grounds for changing the relation-
ship when one person is not holding up his or her end of the deal. 
The distinction between contracts and deals becomes particularly 
useful in discussing family law's treatment of pair bond exchanges. 
Legal doct rine treats the property-sharing part of the pair bond ex-
change as contractual, the sex part as a mere deal, and the home-
making part as something in between. 
1. Property and Income Sharing 
Most marriages are governed by the terms of the state-supplied 
marriage contract. As a general matter that means that courts do not 
enforce contracts that spouses enter with one another during a mar-
riage, but when a marriage ends by divorce, family law mandates 
that spouses split property they acquired during the marriage. to2 
(Likewise, when one spouse dies, the other gets a share of marital 
property.) That sharing is just ified by an oft-implicit presumption 
that both wage-earning and homemaking contribute to families.103 
The 2008 divorce of Claire and Samuel Faiman illustrates the pre-
sumption, though the court did not explicitly justify its holding on the 
grounds that marriage is a partn ership.104 Claire and Samuel Faiman 
married late in life, when she was sixty-one and he ten years older. 105 
Both were divorced, with children from their earlier marriages.106 Be-
cause Samuel's home and real estate business were in Connecticut, 
Claire had to leave her twenty-five-year job in a Scarsdale, New 
York, synagogue, the house she had lived in for over three decades, 
and the community where she had raised her children. t 07 While nei-
ther Claire nor Samuel was rich, his net worth (around $2.2 million) 
was around ten times hers. tos As with many couples, their arrange-
ment reflected the pair bond exchange, though he was stingier and 
more controlling than most providers. 
Samuel paid for most household expenses, giving Claire a weekly 
shopping "allowance" of one hundred fifty to three hundred dollars, 
102. See 3 ArlNOLO H. RUTKIN, FAMI LY LAw & PRACTICE (2014); Mary Anne Case, En-
forcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J .L. & POL'Y 225. 235 (2011). 
103. See U.M.D.A. § 307 (1974). 
104. Faiman v. Faiman, No. FA074028181. 2008 WL 5481382 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 
5. 2008). 
105. Id. at *l. 
106. Id. at *2. 
107. Id. at *l. 
108. la. at *8. 
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but withholding it when they went on trips.109 He kept control over 
the bank accounts and did not make her an owner of their home. 110 
She paid for her personal expenses out of her modest social security 
payments. u 1 Despite Samuel's tightfisted ways, Claire performed her 
part of the exchange, shopping, cooking, and caring for him during a 
triple bypass surgery, colon cancer, and leukemia that required 
chemotherapy. u 2 In addition to changing his bandages and colostomy 
bag, she also managed the household and business accounts when he 
could not, though he removed her name from the accounts as soon as 
he recovered.113 Even during their divorce trial she served him break-
fast, lunch, and dinner every day.114 Though Samuel had many 
faults- the judge described him as "secretive and controlling," "rude, 
and even physically abusive"-he at least was honest, testifying at 
trial that Claire was a "dutiful wife who kept a nice home."115 
You cannot help but wonder why she put up with him. She did 
consider leaving when, two years into the marriage, he went to visit 
an old girlfriend in New Hampshire, leaving a note on the refrigera-
tor saying he would be back the next day .116 Claire stayed because, 
she explained to the court, she "loved him very much" and didn't 
want a divorce. 117 Though she did not say so on the record, she also 
may have stayed because she had given away to her son her Scars-
dale house-her only significant asset- and because Samuel had de-
manded a prenup three days before their wedding. 118 
Six weeks before the ceremony, Samuel had said that he wanted a 
prenup.119 But after Claire talked to an attorney and the couple went 
to the library to look at some forms, Samuel decided he did not need 
a prenup. t2o Then he changed his mind again. 121 He called Claire in 
New York, where she was still working for the synagogue, and told 
her she had to come to Connecticut because they had "some papers to 
sign."t22 She got permission of her rabbi-also her employer-to leave 
109. Id. at *2. 
llO. Id. at *3-4. 
111. Id. at *2. 
112. ld. at *1. *4 . 
113. id. at *4. 
114. id. 
115. id. at *3-4. 
116. ld. at *3. 
117. ld. 
118. Id. at *l. *5. 
119. Id. at *4. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at *5. 
122. La. 
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work early, and drove an hour and a half to his house.123 He was 
wait ing for her in the driveway and drove the two of them to his law-
yer's office.124 Ther e she met Samuel's lawyer and the lawyer he had 
gotten for her, and she saw the prenup for the first time. 125 She was 
"all shook up," she testified, and surprised because she thought the 
papers would be about Samuel giving her $100,000 so she wouldn't 
have problems with his children. 126 Instead, the agreement said that 
he would keep all t he money and property to himself. t27 The attorney 
who met with her for fifteen or thirty minutes testified that she 
seemed "surprised at what was being discussed."128 Samuel told her 
"no agreement, no wedding." 129 Claire didn't s ign it right away. In-
stead, she took it home, and the next day she signed it without ever 
reading it.130 
Claire and Samuel did divorce in 2008, after twenty years togeth-
er.131 She was eighty-one and he was ninety-one but still strong 
enough to try to fight off her claim to any wealth acquired during 
their marriage. 132 The question at trial was whether to enforce the 
prenup that waived Claire's right to alimony or any property held in 
Samuel's name.133 That meant nearly all the property, because h e 
had made sure that just about everything was his and his alone. The 
court ruled in Claire's favor and refused to enforce the premarital 
agreement. 13'1 
In Faiman v. Faiman, the judge reasoned that Claire should get 
alimony from Samuel because her signature was not fully volun-
tary.135 She did not have time to review the agreement, Samuel's 
lawyer drafted the agreement and picked Claire's lawyer, and no one 
told her what she was giving up. 136 Although the formal holding turns 
on voluntariness, partnership reasoning seems to underlie that out-
come. A footnote mentions that "[t]he investment of human capital in 
homemaking has worth," 137 and the court's detailed account of all 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at *7. 
128. Id. at *6. 
129. Id. a t *6. *9. 
130. id. a t *5. 
131. ld. a t *l. 
132. ld. 
133. Id. at *l. *7. 
134. Id. at *10. 
135. Id. at *9. 
136. Id. 
137. id. a t *4 n .7 (quoting O'Neill v. O'Neill, 536 A.2d 978, 984 (Co1m. App. Ct. 1988)). 
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Claire did for Samuel suggests that the judge found it simply unfair 
to allocate all marital property to Samuel, leaving Claire with "abso-
lutely nothing other than the five-year-old car that she is driving."138 
The court may have also seen Samuel visiting that old girlfriend as a 
breach of his promise to forsake all others, though as the case on fi-
delity agreements below shows, courts generally refuse to enforce 
that part of pair bond exchanges. 
Samuel could, of course, have contracted around at least some of 
this property sharing by fully disclosing his assets and giving Claire 
sufficient time to review the prenup's terms and get independent le-
gal counsel. The fact that some states impose additional limits like 
refusing to enforce alimony-limiting agreements, requiring substan-
tive fairness, or placing the burden of proof on the person seeking to 
hoard property further suggests that family law can make the prop-
erty-sharing element of the pair bond exchange a particularly sticky 
default rule.139 
Before the 1970s, most courts treated any attempt to contract out 
of property sharing at divorce as merely a deal because, they rea-
soned, the government set the terms of the marriage contract, not the 
spouses themselves. 140 Some scholars argue family law should correct 
the problem of devalued caregiving by returning to the old rule that 
treated prenups that limited property sharing on divorce as mere 
deals. 14 1 But the long history of family exchanges argues for spouses 
holding onto their contractual freedom. Instead, courts could recog-
nize that a property-hoarding prenup fundamentally alters a couple's 
pair bond exchange. That would mean recognizing as contractual the 
homemaking part of the pair bond exchange. 
2. Homemaking 
The pair bond exchange is embedded so deeply in the infrastruc-
ture of family law that it can be hard to see. While cases like Faiman 
and law review articles recognize marriage as a partnership in which 
both spouses reasonably expect to share in the money that comes in 
the door during the marriage, family law discourse tends too often to 
see homemaking as a gift. 
The 1993 divorce of Michael and Hildegard Borelli illustrates this 
pattern. 14 2 Seventy-something San Francisco businessman Michael 
138. Id. at *4. 
139. Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and Mari· 
tal A,,,areements, 46 FAA!. L.Q. 313, 318-19, 321 (2012). 
140. NANCY F. COTT. P UBLIC Vows : A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11 (2000). 
14 l. Katharine B. Silbaugh. Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 65. 135 (1998). 
142. Borelli v. Brusseau. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (CaJ. Ct. App. 1993). 
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Borelli married Hildegard in 1980, when she was thirty-nine. 143 The 
day before their wedding, they signed a premarital agreement that 
reserved most of his property-worth around $1.5 million-for his 
daughter from a prior marriage. 144 Unlike Claire Faiman, Hildegard 
did not challenge the prenup's validity. Instead, she sought to enforce 
an oral agreement they made later to modify it. 145 That oral agree-
ment brought their arrangement back toward the pair bond exchange 
and California's general rule that spouses share property acquired 
during the marriage. 146 
Within a few years of getting married, Michael suffered heart prob-
lems and a stroke. 147 By 1988, his doctors recommended that he live in 
a nursing home because he needed constant care. 148 Understandably, 
he preferred to live at home, even though he and Hildegard would 
have to modify their house. 1'19 Maybe he realized that his reduced mar-
ital obligations under their prenup would justify Hildegard in feeling 
less obliged under the caretaking half of the pair bond exchange. In 
any case, Michael offered to alter the prenup by changing his will to 
give Hildegard some of his property- around $500,000, including 
money for her daughter's education-if she would disregard the doc-
tors' advice and provide the nursing care herself at their home. 150 
Hildegard accepted and performed her part of their agreement, 
personally providing 'round-the-clock nursing care for Michael until 
his death a year later. 151 But Michael never changed his will. 152 She 
sued and lost because family law clung to the fiction that her care-
taking was a pure gift even when Michael did not keep up his end of 
the gift exchange. 153 
To apply this double standard, the court had to ignore that Mi-
chael himself had slipped out of his obligations. Instead of noticing 
Michael's property-hoarding prenup, it chastised Hildegard for trying 
to do what Michael actually did- tailor the terms of the marriage 
contract- declaring that Hildegard could not adjust those terms be-
cause "a wife is obligated by the marriage contract to provide nursing 
143. Id. at 17. 
144. ld.; Wendy L. Hillger, Note, Borelli v. Brusseau: Must a Spouse Also Be a Regis-
tered Nurse? A Feminist Critique. 25 PAC. L.J. 1387. 1414-16 (1994). 
145. Borelli. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 17. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. a t 18. 
153. ld. 
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type care to an ill husband.'%~ Citing pre-World War II cases, the 
court in Borelli said that a husband's agreement to compensate a 
wife undermines the public policy of wives caring for husbands.155 
Hildegard, as the spouse whose contributions came in the form of 
care, feeding, and cleaning, had no right to contractually adjust her 
side of the deal. The court waxed sentimental to justify depriving h er 
of that contractual freedom: 
[T]he marital duty of support under [California law] includes cax-
ing for a spouse who is ill. ... [Itl means more than the physical 
care someone could be hil"ed to provide. Such support also encom-
passes sympathy[,] comfort[,] love, companionship and affection. 
Thus, the duty of support can no more be "delegated" to a third 
party than the statutory duties of fidelity and mutual respect. 156 
The court's contempt for Hildegard's conduct as "sickbed bargaining" 
and "unseemly" is unfair, given Michael's earlier bargaining to get 
out of his support obligations.157 By concluding that "even if few 
things are left that cannot command a price, marital support r emains 
one of them,"158 the court simply ignored the fact that family law al-
lowed Michael, as a financial provider, to contract out of his side of 
the pair bond exchange. I have criticized this double standard else-
where, as have other scholars. 159 
While family law treats the caregiving part of pair bond exchanges 
as something between a binding contract and a mere deal, the next 
Section shows that it treats promises of fidelity- the third element of 
pair bond exchanges- as a mere deal. 
3. Fidelity 
Over the past few decades family law has demoted promises of 
marital fidelity from contracts to mere deals. Until the 1970s, divorce 
required a showing of "fault" like adultery, the equivalent of a mate-
rial breach of the marital contract that justified the state severing 
the relationship through divorce.160 In addition, the wronged spouse 
154. Id. at 19. 
155 Id. at 18-19. 
156. Id. at. 20 (citation omitted). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. See ERTMAN, supra note 7. at 182-83; JOAN W ILLIAMS, UNBENDING GE:NOER: WHY 
FAMJ t.Y ANO WORK CONFLIC'l' ANO WH.AT'l'O Do .ABOU1'JT 114-20 (2000); ZE:t.fZER. supra note 74. 
160. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum. 1991 BYU L. REV. 
79. 79 (1991) ("In the 1970s, a movement to reform divorce laws swept the United States, 
leading to the widespread adopt.ion of no-fault grounds for divorce. Between 1970 and 1975, 
more thru1 half of the states adopted some modem no-fault grow1d for divorce, and by 1985, 
every American jurisdiction except one had adopted some generally available, explicit 11011-
fau lt ground for divorce."). 
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could obtain the equivalent of damages through child custody, a wife 
obtaining more property or alimony, or a husband getting to keep 
more property and pay less alimony.161 
Today's rule of no-fault divorce no longer requixes a showing of 
adultery or other wrongdoing. Instead incompatibility is sufficient to 
justify divorce. 162 In the language of contract doctrine, no fault divorce 
allows spouses to terminate a contract by ending it for a reason other 
than breach. Consequently, even the most formal- signed, sealed, de-
livered- fidelity agreement can get t reated as a mere deal. 163 
Take the agreement of Bernard and Vergestene Cooper. 164 After 
twenty-eight years of marriage Bernard had an affair in 2000, and 
Vergestene wanted to separate.165 But Bernard wanted to stay mar-
ried, so he signed a notarized, written promise that "if any of my in-
discretions lead to and/or are cause of a separation or divorce ... I 
will accept full responsibilit[y] of my action."166 That responsibility, 
they agreed, meant that Vergesten e would get $2600 a month for 
household expenses, half of Bernard's ret irement accounts, and life 
and health insurance. 167 
Things seemed fine for five more years, until Bernard abruptly 
leased an apartment and moved out without telling Vergestene.168 
When she and theix daughters finally located him, Bernard admitted 
to continuing his affair. Vergestene filed for divorce and the trial court 
entered an order that largely tracked the reconciliation agreement. 169 
On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court demoted Bernard and 
Vergestene's formal written reconciliation agreement to a mer e 
deal. 170 It reasoned that spousal relationships cannot be governed by 
"contracts that are plead and proved in the courts as if the matter 
161. Woodhouse, su.pra note 36. a t. 2532. 
162. 1J1 some states. a spouse can unilaterally allege the incompatibility, so that one 
spouse can end the man:iage when the other prefers to s tay married 24 AM. JUR. 2D Di· 
vorce and Separat,ion § 23 (2014). 
163. 1J1 Diosdado u. Diosdado, the agreement was s igned during the marriage, but the 
property would be transferred to the non-cheating spouse only upon divorce. 118 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 494, 495 (Ca l. Ct. App. 2002). Another property transfer borne of adultery did get legal-
ly enforced. When the husband transferred marital property to his wife to induce her not to 
divorce him after she discovered an affair, finalizing the transfe r whi le they were sti ll mar-
ried, the court refused to find Lhat the agreement violated public policy and enforced it. 
Dawbaw v. Dawbarn, 625 S.E.2d 186, 188 (N.C. Ct.. App. 2006); see also At.wood & Bix, 
supra note 139. at 321-22. 
164. Jn re Marriage of Cooper , 769 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 2009). 
165 Id. at 584. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 587. 
2015) MARITAL CONTRACTING 503 
involved the timely delivery of a crate of oranges." 171 Holding Bernard 
to his formal, written promise, the court said, would "create a bar-
gaining environment" in marriage, and courts should not be part of 
"the complex web of interpersonal relationships and the inevitable 
he-said-she-said battles that would arise" if the agreement were en-
forced.172 Following a California case, the court concluded that enforc-
ing the reconciliation agreement also would undermine the no-fault 
provisions of divorce law, reintroducing "acrimonious" proceedings 
that no-fault divorce meant to banish from the courtroom.173 
Cooper is wrongly decided. Nothing in the reported case indicates 
that the Coopers tried to make adultery or other fault a precondition 
for divorce. The formal, signed, notarized writing merely provided an 
incentive for Bernard to keep his promise by allocating property to 
Veregene if he strayed again. Rather than protecting some imagined 
state of marriage that is free of all bargaining, the Iowa court created 
an opportunity for cheaters to prosper by virtue of trusting spouses' 
reliance on the cheaters' empty promises. 
Marriage equality for same-sex couples may offer family law, family 
lawyers, and same-sex couples themselves a chance to make legal obli-
gations better match a couple's reasonable expectations in fidelity as 
well as property-sharing, caregiving, and other matters. The remain-
der of this Article reviews empirical data on the pair bond exchanges of 
same-sex and different-sex couples, looking first to numbers and then 
to stories. A sense of how gay couples do and do not adopt different 
pair bond exchanges could help policy makers and couples themselves 
make informed choices about how the law does and should treat cou-
ples' agreements about money, housework, and sex. 
II. QUANTITATIVE DATA COMPARING HETEROSEXUAL 
AND GAY PAIR BOND EXCHANGES 
Heterosexual couples, by definition, include one man and one 
woman, while gay couples are made up of either two men or two 
women. This gender difference has led sociologists to compare gay 
and straight couples to tease out the role of gender in relationships. 174 
While that research has delved into many aspects of intimacy, here 
we focus on differences in the three main elements of the pair bond 
exchange: money, housework, and sex. 
171. Id. at 586. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 586-87 (citing Diosdado v. Diosdado, l 18 Cal. Rptr . 2d 494, 496 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002)). 
174. See, e.g., PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER S CHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY. 
WO.RI<. SEX (1983). 
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University of Chicago economist Dan Black and his colleagues 
used data collected in the 2000 Census to compare same-sex and dif-
ferent-sex couples.175 Black reasoned that couples who do have chil-
dren would specialize more because the expenses (time, finances, ef-
fort, opportunity costs) of raising children are most efficiency borne 
by one partner specializing in homemaking and the other in wage 
labor. 176 He predicted that if gays are less likely than straights to 
have children, then they would specialize less. That lack of speciali-
zation, he hypothesized, would result in gay men not engaging as in-
tensely in wage labor as heterosexual men, and lesbians engaging in 
wage labor more intensely than straight women. 177 Likewise, he pre-
dicted that gay and lesbian couples would more equitably share 
household chores than straight couples. 178 
To compare gay and straight couples requires comparing whether 
gays and straights couple at equivalent rates. According to the Gen-
eral Social Survey, a commonly used database which pools data from 
surveys from 1989 to 2004, 179 lesbians and heterosexuals partner at 
about the same rate- sixty-three percent and fifty-nine percent, re-
spectively- and gay men at a slightly lower rate of fifty percent.180 
Thus, data about gays, lesbians, and straight men and women gener-
ally should tell us something about the kind of pair bond exchanges 
each kind of couple is likely to make. 
A. Property and Income Sharing 
While women have enjoyed higher earnings over the past few dec-
ades, and men's r elative earning power has declined as the American 
economy has transitioned from manufacturing to services and infor-
mation, 181 men still make more than women, on average. True, wom-
en represent half of the American workforce, bringing home more of 
the family income than they used to. A 2005 study found that about a 
quarter of married women make more than their husbands. 182 But 
that pattern lasted more than three years for only sixty percent of 
those couples, and on average women still work fewer hours for lower 
wages, only bringing home thirty-seven percent of the average fami-
175. Black et al .. supra note 11. 
176. Id. at 61. 66. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 62. 
179. NAT'L OPINION .RESEARCH CTR., GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, http://www3.norc.org/ 
GSS+Website/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
180. Black et al. , supra note 11. at 56. 
18l. See generally MUNOY. supra note 62. at 51-55. 
182. See Shelly Lw1dberg & Robert A. Pollak, The American Family and Family Eco-
nomics. 21 J. ECON. PE:RSPE:CTIV~:s 3, 7-8 (2007). 
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ly's income as of 2009.183 Along the same lines, a 2004 study showed 
that over their prime earning years American women earn thirty-
eight percent of men's wages.184 Because less than five percent of 
people identify as gay or lesbian, 185 most of the people in these stud-
ies wer e heterosexual. 
Those income differences are due in part to patterns in what ma-
jors and careers heterosexuals, gay men, and lesbians choose. Accord-
ing to the 2000 Census, a comparison of partnered men and women 
aged twenty-five to sixty indicates that men in gay partnerships have 
"moderately" lower wages and income than men in heterosexual rela-
tionships (married or unmarried).186 Partnered lesbians, in contrast, 
have "moderately higher wages and substantially higher income" 
than corr esponding heterosexual women.187 Along the same lines, gay 
men are more likely than other men to work in stereotypically female 
occupations like education and the fine arts, and are slightly less 
likely than other men to pursue graduate education. Gay men also 
tend to work fewer hours per week and fewer weeks per year.188 
Likewise, lesbians are more likely than other women to work in ste-
reotypically masculine occupations like engineering, economics, and 
business and more likely to pursue more education, opt for a profes-
sion that enjoys higher pay, remain continuously attached to the la-
bor force, and work long hours. 189 These patterns produce more in-
come equality within gay and lesbian couples than within straight 
couples.190 
Household income reflects these patterns. A household made of 
lesbian partners is similar to a heterosexual couple, while a gay male 
couple enjoys about twenty-five percent more income.191 That differ-
ence may well be due to the presence of children in people's lives. 
Children, of course, require tending that results in their caretakers-
often female-engaging less in income-generating activities than 
they might otherwise. 
Many gay people have kids, though not as many as heterosexuals. 
One would expect as much, given the history of social and de jure dis-
183. ld.; BUREAU OF LABOR STATlSTICS. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR. WOMEN rN 'rHE LABOR 
FORCE: ADATABOOK 2 (2011). available at h ttp://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf.databook-2011.pdf. 
184. WILLIAMS, supra note 67. at 26. 
185. Black et a l. , supra note 11, at 54. 
186. Id. at 64. 
187. Id. a t 65. 
188. Id. at 65-66. 
189. Id. at 64-66. 
190. Id. at 62; Gotta et al., supra note 12. a i 364; Sondra E. Solomon el a l. , Money, 
Housework, Sex, and Co11,flicl: Same-Sex Couples i11 Civil Un.ions, Those Nol in Civil Un-
ions, and Heterosexual Manied Siblings, 52 S~:x ROLES 561, 565-67 (2005). 
191. Black et al., supra note 11, at 67. 
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crimination against gay people and the biological fact that gay sex 
does not produce unintended pregnancy. According to Williams Insti-
tute demographer Gary Gates, the 2008 General Social Survey r e-
ports that forty-nine percent of lesbians and bisexual women and 
twenty percent of gay and bisexual men say they have had a child}92 
Heterosexuals, in contrast, have parenthood rates of between forty 
and forty-eight percent. 193 A 2005 study compared gay couples who 
entered civil unions in Vermont and gay couples who did not get "civ-
il unionized" with the heterosexual married siblings of both groups. I t 
found that eighty percent of the married women had children, com-
pared to thirty-four percent of women in civil unions and thirty-one 
percent of women not in civil unions. 194 In contrast, eighty-two per-
cent of heterosexual men in that study had children, compared to fif-
teen percent of the men in civil unions and just ten percent of the gay 
men not in civil unions. t95 Together, these data suggest that hetero-
sexuals are most likely to have children, followed by lesbians, with 
gay men least likely to be parents. 
Those structural factors- more engagement in well-remunerated 
wage labor for straight men and lesbians and greater likelihood of 
heterosexual women to have kids than gay men-both reflect and 
reinforce cultural norms. Boys and men are generally socialized to 
believe that being a good provider translates to being a good man, 
while women and girls are still socialized to believe that being a good 
mother and caretaker translates to being a good woman.196 
B. Homemaking 
Because gay and lesbian couples are less likely than their hetero-
sexual counterparts to be parents, they are less likely to have one 
partner at home full-time.197 But among the gay and lesbian couples 
that have children, rates of stark specialization-one partner at 
home full-time-are comparable to the rates among heterosexual 
parents . As of the 2000 Census, about a quarter of lesbian households 
raising children had one partner at home full-time, just below the 
192. GARY ,J. GATES. Wl LLIAMS INST., LG BT PARENTING IN THE UNITIW STATES (2013). 
available al http://wiUiamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-conient/uploadsfLGBT-Parenting.pdf. 
193. Id.; GARY J. GATES, NAT'L COUNCIL ON FA.<\1. RELATIONS, FAi\filY FOR.M.ATJON AND 
RAISING CHILDREN AMONG SAME·SEX COUPLES. at F2. F3 (2011). available at 
h ttp://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp·Contentluploads/Gates·Badgett-NCFR·LGBT-
Families·December-2011.pdf. These data are made messy by the fact that a good number of 
gay people with kids conceived them in a heterosexual relationship and then came out. so 
that the same child would count for both categories. 
194. Solomon et al., supra note 190, at 565. 
195. Id. at 568. 
196. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 11, ai 168; SCHULTE. supra note 63. 158-59. 
197. Black et al .• supra note 11, at 62-63. 
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rate-one-third-for heterosexuals and gay male parents. 198 Among 
heterosexuals, women are more than twice as likely to be the at-
home parent. 199 For all three types of couples, the one pursuing wage 
labor is likely to be more educated.200 
But differences emerge bet ween heterosexual and LGBT house-
holds when it comes to paying the mortgage and divvying up house-
hold chores, even among households raising kids. A 2010 study re-
ported that when one lesbian mom is home full-time and the other 
works outside of the home, the two share parenting much more than 
heterosexual couples.201 Pepper Schwartz and Philip Blumstein's 
classic 1983 study American Couples found that gay men who had 
been married to women shared housework more equitably with their 
male partners than they had with their wives.202 A 2005 study found 
that same-sex couples more equitably divided housework even when 
one earned more money.203 
That pattern may be changing. A 2011 study compared data on 
straight, lesbian, and gay relationships in 1975 and 2000. Consistent 
with other research, it found that in both t ime periods lesbian and 
gay couples reported more equality in household tasks than hetero-
sexual couples.204 But it also revealed that while heterosexual couples 
in the 2000 data set still tended to assign household tasks based on 
gender (vacuuming for women, household repairs for men), during 
the two periods studied, men in straight couples took on more femi-
nine household labor and gays and lesbians reported less equitable 
sharing of household labor in 2000 than they did in 1975.205 As we 
will see in Part III on qualitative measures of pair bond exchanges, 
gay and lesbian couples may become more willing to recognize and dis-
cuss inequality in their household arrangement as the legit imacy that 
comes with same-sex marriage and other victories of the LGBT rights 
movement reduces the need for gay couples to see themselves as dif-
ferent-and sometimes better-than heterosexuals in some other way. 
C. Fidelity 
Differences play out in different ways when it comes to sex. One 
element of conventional pair bond exchanges-sexual exclusivity-is 
198. ld. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. See Rachel H. Farr et al., Parenting and Child Development in Adoptive Families: 
Does Parental Sexual Orientation Matter?. 14 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL Ser. 164 (2010). 
202. M UNDY, supra note 62. 
203. See, e.g., Solomon et al.. supra note 190. at 572. 
204. See Gotta et a l.. supra note 12. 
205. Id. at 361. 
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generally deemed not legally relevant. In the 1980s and 1990s, when 
no state allowed same-sex couples to register their relationships, sex 
did play a role in the terms of relationship agreements, which were 
the most common way to create legal "us-ness." Prior to the wide-
spread acceptance of cohabitation agreements, same-sex sexuality 
was so outre that merely mentioning sexuality in a living-together 
agreement could get it kicked out of court for being "meretricious," or 
akin to prostitution.206 For some years now, however, courts have 
been willing to treat sex as just one part of a relationship.207 Just to 
be safe, however, practitioners strongly counsel against including any 
mention of a couple's sexual relationship in their cohabitation 
agreement. 208 
Yet agreements about sex play a crucial role in many, if not most, 
couples' relationships. That mismatch between legal rules and the 
lived experiences of couples can be addressed by finding a term to 
describe the agreements that family law ignores. I call them "deals" 
to distinguish them from "contracts," which black letter law defines 
as promises that the law enforces.209 
Unlike the money and-to a lesser extent-housework provisions 
of the pair bond exchange, the sex terms of pair bond exchanges are 
generally quite different in gay male relationships than straight and 
lesbian ones. Gay men are much more likely to make agreements 
that allow for sex with partners outside of the relationship. A 2005 
study by Sondra Solomon fleshes out these differences by comparing 
three groups: "civil-unionized" gay-male and lesbian couples, gay and 
lesbian couples not in civil unions, and the heterosexual married sib-
lings of the other subjects.210 The researchers found that only half of 
gay men in civil unions reported having explicit agreements that sex 
outside their relationship was not okay, a much lower rate of monog-
amy agreements than heterosexual husbands had with their wives 
(seventy-five percent).211 Among gay male couples not in civil unions, 
only a third made agreements to remain monogamous.212 Consistent 
with these agreements, over half of all the gay men studied had sex 
outside their relationship, compared to only fifteen percent of the 
heterosexual men. 
206. ,Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rplr. 130, 134 (Cal . CL. App. 1981). 
207. Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
208. RALPH WARNER, TONJ IBARA & FREDERICK HERTZ, LJVING TOGETHER: A LEGAL 
GUIDE FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES 25 (15th ed. 2013). 
209. ERTMAN. supra note 7. at xi. 
210. Solomon et aL supra note 190. 
21 1. Id. 
212. Id. at 571. 
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Surprisingly, all that extra-curricular sex seems not to make gay 
male couples more likely to break up.213 While gay men are less likely 
to couple-up than lesbians, when they do establish a life together as a 
couple, those gay male couples are more likely to stay together.2 t4 
That may be due to explicit deals about the conditions under which 
they can have sex with people outside of the relationship. Agreeing 
that sex outside the relationship-often with conditions about where 
and with whom- is much more common in gay male relationships 
than among either lesbians or heterosexual spouses. 215 More than 
forty percent of the gay male couples-both registered and non -
registered-in the Solomon study had agreements that allowed sex 
with people outside their relationship, compared to only five percent 
of lesbians and heterosexual couples.216 Another study, published in 
2010 and based on data collected in 2002, surveyed thirty-nine gay 
male couples in San Francisco's Bay Area about their agreements 
about monogamy. Those researchers found that only thirty-one per-
cent of the couples reported agreeing to be monogamous, and even 
those conceded that they defined monogamy to allow for situations 
like a masseur giving his clients a "happy ending," which is spa lingo 
for an end-of-the-massage orgasm.2t7 Explicit non-monogamy agree-
ments were twice as common-reported by sixty-four percent of the 
Bay Area couples- but even then, many of the couples set limits like 
both of them being present at the encounter or separating emotional 
from sexual interaction by designating friends and ex-lovers as for-
bidden fruit. 218 
In marked contrast to the often open relationships of gay men, the 
lesbian and straight couples in Solomon's Vermont study reported 
very different agreements. Only five percent of both lesbian and het-
erosexual married couples had non-monogamy agreements (a rate 
that held for both registered and non-registered couples).219 
Those numbers, while important, do little to convey the social, 
emotional, and other details of pair bond exchanges. Accordingly, we 
now turn to qualitative material. 
213. Fewer than ten percenL of the gay men in the study reported having had a "mean-
ingful love affair" outside their relationships. much less than one would expect with fi{'ty 
percenL rates of extra-relat ionship sexuality. Td. aL 574. 
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III. QUALITATIVE DATA COMPARING THE PAIR BOND 
E XCHANGES OF STRAIGHT AND GAY COUPLES 
Stories of family life and family law breathe life into all the nu-
merical data in the prior Section. As with Part II, the following dis-
cussion illustrates the numerical data on pair bond exchanges with 
stories drawn from the trenches of family law and ethnographic work 
on same-sex couples. As a whole, they indicate that many same-sex 
couples commonly expect different things from family-and thus 
from family law-than different-sex spouses do. 
Philadelphia lawyer Margaret !<law's book Keeping It Civil vividly 
portrays the details of a family lawyer's docket.220 Among the some-
times surprising stories she tells from three decades of practicing 
family law is Klaw's observation that men getting divorced are gen-
erally "fundamentally comfortable with the idea that [they] will need 
to provide for [their wives] after they're no longer married."22 1 Rather 
than resist the very idea of alimony or property sharing, most men 
"takeO pride" in being "a provider," so much so that Kla w says that a 
man's ability to keep his family comfortable after a divorce is often a 
"mark of social status" for both high-earning and other men.222 The 
tight link between masculinity and financially supporting your fami-
ly is illustrated by a conversation she had in the course of represent-
ing the wife in a divorce. The attorney for the husband-a rough-
around-the-edges fellow who also practices criminal law- told Klaw 
that he had discouraged his male client from pursuing alimony from 
Klaw's client: "'My guy asked me if he could get alimony from your 
lady, and I told him, yeah, maybe, but don't be a pussy.' "223 Klaw's 
female clients do not expect to share their retirement accounts with 
their husbands and "almost to a woman, they become apoplectic at 
the prospect of paying alimony ."22'1 She believes that these women 
who earn more than their underemployed or non-working husbands 
are "deeply disappointed that they married men who didn't carry 
their weight financially" because the women did not grow up expect-
ing to be the main providers for their families.225 
Many gay people feel differently. Though some gays come out in 
mid-life, after years or even decades in heterosexual relationships, a 
good number of gay people know early on that they are unlikely to be 
either a provider or someone who takes care of the home front as part 
of a heterosexual pair bond exchange. One couple, Scott and Mike, 
220. KLAw, supra note 67. 
221. Id. at 64. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. la. at 65. 
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who had been together for a dozen years before getting married in a 
small civil ceremony at Cambridge City Hall in Massachusetts, pur-
posely kept it small to reflect their "adamant" belief that "they did 
not seek any kind of blessing, religious or otherwise."226 They told so-
ciologist Kim Richman that their feelings about marriage were dif-
ferent than straight couples: 
If your whole mind-set is that it's not an option you kind of change 
your whole life around that it doesn't mean what it might mean to 
straight people. As a gay person you just don't think there's ever 
that option so you don't look to that for your security. You make 
your own security.221 
Mignon Moore's recent study of African-American lesbians reported 
that this view was held by "the overwhelming majority" of the cou-
ples studied. As one subject in Moore's study put it, "I don't give a 
damn who you're with, you always need to be able to be independent 
and take care of yourself."228 
While Richman's subjects Scott and Mike emphasized the link be-
tween their gay identity and self-sufficiency, Moore's subjects had a 
different focus depending on their class. Women from working class 
backgrounds saw everyone in the household as having an equal re-
sponsibility to contribute financially, and they also wanted to have 
the income to escape an unstable or unhealthy relationship.229 Middle 
and upper middle class women in her study, in contrast, viewed eco-
nomic self-sufficiency as important because it furthers personal 
growth and self-actualization.23° In either case, Moore's black lesbian 
couples saw prolonged unemployment as a "deal breaker,"231 a phrase 
that underlines the contractual expectations within the relationship. 
Gay people coming of age in a post-Goodrich and post-Windsor 
world may feel differently, and subgroups of gay people (African-
Americans, say, or lesbians) may well retain a preference for econom-
ic self-sufficiency. Moore and Richman both collected their data in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.232 That data is largely 
drawn from pre-Millennials who came of age when sodomy was still a 
crime and were old enough to have begun and ended a few big rela-
tionships before marriage equality began to become a legal reality. 
Since the state would not recognize their "us-ness," they logically re-
226. RrCflNLAN, supra note 31. at 70. 
227. Id. (emphasis added). 
228. MOORE. supra note 11. at 153. 
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sponded by building their lives around self-sufficiency more than 
similarly situated heterosexual men and women. 
In the 1990s many same-sex couples created living-together 
agreements, powers of attorney, and wills to cobble together a sem-
blance of the legal, social, and emotional "us-ness" that the state 
grants through marriage. Many used forms provided in Nolo books 
like Living Together: A Legal Guide for Unmarried Couples.233 The 
latest edition of this series reflects the altered landscape that Wind-
sor and Goodrich have created by giving specific advice on whether 
couples should formalize their relationship through contracts, mar-
riage, or registering with the state under domestic partnership or 
civil union laws.234 In chapters titled "What it Means to be Married," 
"Ten Steps to a Decision," "To Prenup or Not to Prenup," and "Avoid-
ing the Ugly Gay Divorce," seasoned practitioner Fred Hertz counsels 
same-sex couples to think carefully through the financial, social, and 
emotional consequences of exercising their newly acquired right to 
marry.235 As he quips, "the right to marry is not the duty to marry."236 
Hertz focuses on fairness as well as people knowing what they are 
signing onto in getting married, including practical and emotional 
aspects of whatever family form a couple chooses. Pragmatically, he 
instructs, it is easier to not share money socked away in a retirement 
account during the r elationship because dividing that asset is notori-
ously complex.237 But that may be unfair if one person has a much 
higher income or more savings, especially if they have a pair bond 
exchange where the other focuses on maintaining order on the home 
front. Speaking from years of experience counseling clients, Hertz 
acknowledges a disconnect between most gay people's expectations 
about property sharing and family law's general unwillingness to di-
vide property based on bad actions like cheating or abuse: 
Many, many people feel fine about taking care of a partner while 
the relationship is intact and can even imagine splitting up assets 
if the relationship ends by mutual agreement. But those same 
people often balk when they think about sharing with a partner 
who has betrayed them sexually or left them precipitously for rea-
sons they don't understand. 238 
233. D ENJS CLIFFORD. FREDERICK H ERTZ & EMILY D os1<0w. A LEGAL GUIDE FOR 
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That advice suggests that family lawyers may be in the habit of 
counseling clients that property-hoarding may be the easiest way to 
go, at least for the higher-earning person in a couple. But if Windsor 
alters the social meaning of marriage-and being gay-practitioners 
may come to encourage more "us-ness" among same-sex spouses, re-
flecting spouses' evolving expectations. 
Sociologist Judith Stacey provides another front-row account of 
the intricacies of same-sex relationships, but from the perspective of 
an ethnographer rather than a legal problem solver. Her book Un-
hitched documents the details-including contracts and deals about 
money, house-keeping, and sex-of a number of gay-male family ar-
rangements in Los Angeles.239 Unlike attorney Fred Hertz, who tends 
to see clients when they are either in, anticipating, or trying to avoid 
legal disputes, Stacey collected a snowball sample of gay couples, 
asked them lots of questions, and observed how they live their lives. 
Having done most of her data collection before her subjects could get 
married or otherwise register with the state, she witnessed gay cou-
ples' ingenuity in cobbling together deals that work for them, con-
cluding that gay people are "at once freer and more obliged than most 
of the rest of us to craft the basic terms of their romantic and domes-
tic unions."240 The agreements she documents among gay parents, 
which she describes as "thoughtful, magnanimous, [and] child-
centered," must help them function as a family, because most of them 
were still intact and getting along when she checked in with them a 
decade after her initial research.241 
But most couples do not hire attorneys to commit these promises 
to paper, nor do they even talk through their intentions about who 
owns how much of what or for how long, as Stacey's subjects did. 
Moreover, changed circumstances can decrease the usefulness of even 
the most carefully thought-through agreement. Consider Sandy and 
Fran, a couple whose break-up Fred Hertz characterizes as "explo-
sive."242 Though they started off with roughly equal commitments to 
wage earning and tending the home fires, that changed when their 
disabled son came into the picture and Sandy's aging parents needed 
help. Sandy cut back on her high-tech consulting business, while 
Fran upped the on-call hours of her medical practice, moving more 
into the husbandly provider role. Resentment on both sides bubbled 
239. JUOl'l' H $ 'l'ACEY. UNHl'l'CHEO: LOVE. MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY VALUES FROM WEST 
HOLLYWOOD TO WESTERN CHINA (2011). 
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up over the years and eventually boiled over, leading to an acrimoni-
ous divorce.243 
One reason that break-ups like Sandy and Fran's can get so ugly 
is that many couples live out a different pair bond exchange than at 
least one of them thinks they have. The studies that show equal shar-
ing of household tasks in same-sex couples generally gather data by 
having couples self-report their practices. Two sociologists who have 
done ethnographic research on same-sex couple households-
Christopher Carrington and Mignon Moore-contend that couples 
believe in equality but divide homemaking labor unequally. 
According to Carrington, studies of gay and lesbian couples prior 
to the 1970s reported role specialization, with one partner playing a 
butch role by providing financially and the other playing a femme 
role by taking on responsibility for many or most household tasks.24'1 
This is quite different from the conventional wisdom about relative 
equality in gay couples that researchers since the 1970s have docu-
mented based on the couples' self-reporting. Yet both Carrington's 
1998 study and Mignon's 2011 study suggest that couples do not di-
vide the housework as equitably as they report. The couples that 
Carrington and Mignon interviewed and observed closely over time 
reflected the belief in equity, reporting equal sharing of housework.24 5 
But their actual observations, painstakingly recorded during days-
and in Carrington's case, weeks-of observing couples cooking, clean-
ing, grocery shopping, and otherwise keeping house, revealed a dif-
ferent story .246 
The couples' actions were actually closer to the pair bond ex-
change in which one person in a couple performs most of the work 
that makes a house a home. Take Narvin and Lawrence, a couple in 
Carrington's study. Narvin's Ivy-League MBA yielded a much higher 
income than Lawrence's nursing degree and required many more 
hours of work each week.247 After a difficult period in which Law-
rence's r esearch job kept him away evenings, he scaled back by tak-
ing a day-shift nursing position and taking care of "stuff ... from 
laundry to shopping ... trying to get the house to feel more like a 
home."248 Carrington suggests that what he calls the "egalitarian 
myth" is supported by homemakers themselves, who downplay their 
cont ributions or actively conceal the many tasks it takes to keep a 
243. Id. at 178-79. 
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household running smoothly.249 He describes a conversation he had 
with Sarah, a graphic artist who works at home, squeezes in domes-
tic tasks throughout the day, making sure to get the laundry folded 
before her partner Andrea gets home.250 When pressed to say why it 
had to happen then, Sarah explained, "I just don't want her to have 
to deal with it. I really like us to be able to have quality time when 
she gets here. She has enough pressure to deal with at work, so I try 
to keep this kind of stuff out of the way."251 
Moore's couples, who included many women who had become 
mothers in earlier r elationships with men, tended to allocate most of 
the homemaking labor and financial decision-making to the biological 
mothers.252 The lesbian partners of bio-moms value this work, Moore 
found, when she realized that the stepmothers reported that the bio-
moms spend more time each week on household labor than the bio-
moms did themselves.253 (Heterosexual men, in contrast, exaggerate 
the time they spend on homemaking tasks and underestimate the 
time their female pa1·tners spend on those tasks.)2"'1 As Jocelyn, a bio-
mom in Moore's s tudy put it, 
I'm the domestic person, I do the cooking, I do the laundry .... I 
just think I wash dishes faster than her. So instead of her standing 
over the sink for an hour, we can have more quality time. So she 
does volunteer to do it, and I'll say, "Oh no, I'll do it."255 
Sarah and Jocelyn's careful management of the emotional tenor of 
their evenings-not to mention the laundry and the dishes- is the 
kind of task that remains invisible when done well. Yet that invisibil-
ity, coupled with larger social, legal, and economic devaluation of 
much of this work as menial or inferior "women's work," may make it 
harder for same-sex couples to see the extent to which their relation-
ships include the kind of pair bond exchanges that shape many dif-
fer ent-sex marriages. 
Same-sex couples' self-reporting may more closely reflect their 
pair bond exchanges as the day-to-day r eality of living in a relation-
ship that both law and society recognize sinks into gay couples' con-
sciousness and habits. The fourth and final Part of this Article identi-
fies three additional things that researchers should notice as they 
study the evolution of families and family law in the age of marriage 
equality. 
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IV. FORECASTING WHETHER MARRIAGE EQUALITY WILL CHANGE 
MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE-RELATED DOCTRINES 
This Article's examination of pair bond exchanges helps ground 
predictions about whether marriage equality will change marriage or 
gay people, or both. While there is not much data yet, the studies 
done to date suggest that the change may well go in both directions. 
Therefore students of the family should keep an eye on three things: 
(1) same-sex couples' children, (2) ethnographers who chart the way 
families actually divvy up financial and homemaking tasks, and (3) the 
heterosexuals. But only the third item is likely to alter family law. 
A. Watch the Children 
One would expect that as gay and lesbian couples enjoy more legal 
and social support, more of them will be raising children. But that 
change will play out differently among subgroups in the LGBT com-
munity.256 As of the 2010 Census, same-sex couples who consider 
themselves to be spouses are more than twice as likely to be raising 
biological, step, or adopted children when compared to same-sex cou-
ples who say they are unmarried partners.257 We saw in Parts II and 
III, above, that many of these parents are investing in their families 
by having one spouse spend more time and effort as breadwinners 
and the other spend more time making sandwiches, with gay couples 
raising children being just about as likely as straight couples to have 
one person at home full-time. But contrary to that expectation, the 
so-called "gayby boom" has not steadily increased the prevalence of 
gay men or lesbians raising children. 
Acco1·ding to Williams Institute demographer Gary Gates, U.S. 
Census Bureau data indicate that in 1990 twelve percent of unmar-
ried same-sex couples were raising kids, a rate that increased to 
nineteen percent in 2006 and then decreased again to sixteen percent 
in 2009.258 Gates explains these surprising data by pointing out that 
some ways that gays and lesbians become parents have increased-
as one would expect- while others have decreased. The likelihood of 
becoming a parent via adoption nearly doubled between 2000 and 
2009, increasing from ten percent of unmarried same-sex partner 
households to nineteen percent.259 That increase, however, is offset by 
decreases in LGBT becoming parents at a young age. Those two 
trends are compatible if we assume that marriage equality and other 
256. See J UNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: How INEQUALITY ls 
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forms of legitimacy of gay and lesbian relationships has made birth 
moms, agencies, and others in the adoption process more open to plac-
ing a child with a same-sex couple at the same time it eased the way 
for young adults to acknowledge their sexuality and thereby avoid hav-
ing a child in a heterosexual relationship before coming out.260 
If Dan Black and his colleagues are correct that the expectation 
and experience of raising children causes men to engage in wage la-
bor more heavily, and women less heavily, on average, and gay peo-
ple increasingly have children, then marriage could well be pushing 
same-sex couples to enter pair bond exchanges more like heterosexu-
al couples. Indeed, Nan Hunter sees "at least some indicators that 
the degree of difference between gay and straight, although still sig-
nificant, is decreasing."261 A 2011 study that compared same-sex and 
heterosexual couples in 1975 and 2000 found that while straight cou-
ples report more equal sharing of housework in 2000 than twenty-
five years earlier, the reverse trend-a reduction of equality-
occurred for same-sex couples. 262 Consistent with theories about the 
efficiency of having one person spend m01·e time keeping house while 
the other spends more t ime keeping up th e bank account, gay and 
lesbian couples divided financial obligations for the household less 
equally in 2000 than in 1975.263 
Different people will interpret these data differently. Hunter, for 
example, expects that fewer people will have children-gay or 
straight- and that family law may evolve to provide different rules 
for relationships with kids than relationships without them.264 I ex-
pect to see differences based on race, class, and age. If whites and 
college graduates are more likely to marry than African-Americans 
and those without college degrees, that pattern is likely to play out 
with black same-sex couples. Millennials who came of age with same-
sex marriage as either a reality in their jurisdiction or a possibility 
on the horizon may tailor their educational and occupational plans 
with children in mind. In contrast, many Boomers, and perhaps Gen-
eration X as well, who came of age thinking of themselves as differ-
ent from their heterosexual counterparts, may expect and experience 
more self-sufficiency than specializat ion in their couple relationships. 
Take forty-something lawyer Lisa Padilla, who married fifty-
something businesswoman Allison Klein in 2011. Instead of merging 
260. Id. 
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all of their finances, they signed a prenup to protect the retirement 
funds each had built up during successful careers. 265 
Many of the same-sex marriages currently taking place represent 
a back log of people who were blocked from marring for years or even 
decades of their r elat ionship. Data may change once gay couples are 
marrying around the same age as different-sex couples do. 
B. Watch the Ethnographers 
Family ethnographers such as Judith Stacey, Christopher Car-
rington, and Mignon Moore provide equally relevant data about the 
fine-grained details of family life. By charting the deals and contracts 
that couples make, and the extent to which their daily lives match 
those agreements, ethnographies can chart the differences between 
the marital arrangements people think they have and the ones they 
are actually living out. 
Columbia law professor Katherine Franke is not a demographer, 
yet she has flagged an issue that bears watching as well. As same-sex 
marriage becomes an accepted part of the doctrinal and social land-
scape, Franke worries that the patterns of equality that same-sex 
couples experience and expect may erode protections for primary 
homemaking spouses in heterosexual marriages.266 Although that 
prospect seems unlikely, since same-sex marriages represent much 
less than one percent of all marriages, 267 minority vanguards can 
herald major social changes.268 It may well be that, as Nan Hunter 
has predicted, family law could adapt to these changes by crafting 
one set of rules for couples with children and another for childless 
couples. 
C. Watch the Heterosexuals 
While minorities can and have brought about social and legal 
change, it seems more likely that the LGBT community is just a con-
venient marker of social, economic, and political changes that the 
larger society has its own reasons to embrace. As the U.S. economy 
continues to move away from manufacturing and toward service and 
information technologies, the economic and homemaking contribu-
tions of men and women, on average, are likely to continue undergo-
265. Louise Raf.kin, If "Forever" Doesn't Work Out: The Same-Sex Prenup. N.Y. 11MES. 
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ing an expansion of women's wage earning and a contraction of eco-
nomic opportunities of middle and working class men. 269 If hetero-
sexual spouses seek out a more egalitarian version of pair bond ex-
changes, it will be because it works for them, not because the gays 
got there first. 
CONCLUSION 
In a post-Windsor world both marriage and marital contracting 
are likely to look a bit different than they have in the past, as will 
gay and lesbian coupling. As oflate 2014, when over half of the states 
and the federal government have extended marriage equality to 
same-sex couples, couples in states that deny marriage equality will 
continue to enter cohabitation and other agreements to create "us-
ness" as same-sex couples have done for decades to make up for the 
state's longstanding refusal to create rights and obligations and rec-
ognize same-sex couples as legitimate families. The terms of those 
agreements likely reflect the lived experiences of many same-sex 
couples, with more equal sharing of financial obligations and house-
work than in most heterosexual couples. 
When, and if, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a fundamental 
right to marry that requires the states that still ban same-sex mar-
riage to change course, that may change. When same-sex couples can 
marry in every state, a good number of same-sex couples may balk 
from the full-throttle property-sharing that the default rules of mar-
riage entail. But I expect that just as the vast majority of regulated 
communities opt for default rules instead of crafting their own 
through private agreements, most people getting married will not 
enter premarital agreements. Moreover, as the years expand the 
number of same-sex spouses who interact with schools, hospitals, gov-
ernment agencies, and houses of worship-let alone family members, 
friends, neighbors, and colleagues- gay and lesbian couples may be 
less likely to think of themselves as different from different-sex cou-
ples. That assimilation may come alongside the continued heterosexu-
alization of same-sex coupling, with more specialization in their pair 
bond exchanges, especially among those couples with children. 
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